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Abstract
Computer modelling for evolutionary systems consists in: 1) to store in
the memory the individual features of each member of a large population;
and 2) to update the whole system repeatedly, as time goes by, according
to some prescribed rules (reproduction, death, ageing, etc) where some de-
gree of randomness is included through pseudo-random number sequences.
Compared to direct observation of Nature, this approach presents two distin-
guishing features. First, one can follow the characteristics of the system in
real time, instead of only observing the current, static situation which is a
long-term consequence of a remote past completely unknown except for some
available fossil snapshots. In particular, one can repeat the whole dynamical
process, starting from the same initial population, using the same ran-
domness, changing only some minor contingency during the process, in order
to study its long-term consequences. Second, evolution necessarily follows a
critical dynamics with long-term memory characteristics, equivalent to
the long-range correlations responsible for the well known universality prop-
erties of static critical phenomena. Accordingly, some strong simplifications
can be applied, allowing one to obtain many characteristics of real populations
from toy models easily implementable on the computer.
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What nowadays we call evolution — the theory describing how living beings behave
under permanent changes, the whole dynamical system never reaching any final, absorb-
ing state — was introduced by Jean Lamarck [1] two centuries ago. He also invented the
name “biologie”. According to him, the many currently observed biological species are not
static, independent entities, but derive from ancient ones after small modifications accumu-
lated during very long times. Lamarck fell into disgrace under the religious/conservative
power dominating his lifetime. Reference [2] presents an amusing and intriguing discus-
sion concerning these subjects. The mechanism leading to this forever-changing scenario
is Charles Darwin’s natural selection [3]. Each individual inherits the characteristics of
its parents, with some small modifications, being similar but not identical to neither the
parents nor the siblings. Among the latters, the ones better adapted to survive under
the current environment are more likely to breed, their offspring carrying the naturally
selected traits from their grand-parents.
A simple way to interpret evolution is to imagine the high-dimensional space of all
possible living forms. Each individual is a point in this space, and their offspring are neigh-
bouring points. Considering asexual reproduction, for simplicity, each offspring can also
produce its own offspring, an so on, according to a branching dynamical process. Some
selected branches of the resulting tree continue to grow further, whereas others are dan-
gling ends without offspring, avoiding population explosion. Under a large-scale overview,
a snapshot of this space of all possible living forms shows a very sparsely, highly inhomo-
geneous occupation pattern: many neighbouring occupied points form a cloud localised in
some small region, separated from other equivalent clouds. Each such a cloud is a species.
Following such a cloud during a short-term time interval, i.e. some few generations, its
many occupied points are continuously replaced by other neighbouring points: the whole
cloud seems to stay immobile. Only under a long-term point of view, i.e. after a large
number of generations, one can observe the extremely slow movement of the cloud as a
whole. Tracing back the movement of two nowadays separated clouds, one would discover
that both derive from the same ancient, possibly no-longer existing, parent cloud, the
so-called speciation process. Thus, evolution occurs according to a branching process not
only under the local point of view of each individual and its offspring, but also under the
much larger scale of species as a whole.
Under a coarse-grained point of view, the same space of all possible living forms can
be re-interpreted: now each cloud (species) corresponds to a single slowly moving Point
(capital P to distinguish it from a single individual). Neighbouring occupied Points form
a Cloud, i.e. a set of neighbouring species, called a genus. Stretching once more the scale,
each genus can be interpreted as a single PPoint (double PP, since my keyboard does not
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provide anything larger than capital letters) within the same space of all possible living
forms. A CCloud of PPoints is called a family. An order is a CCCloud of PPPoints. A
class is a CCCCloud of PPPPoints. Note that each step along this hierarchical sequence
of scalings involves not only larger and larger scales of length (distances measured within
the space of all possible living forms), but also larger and larger scales of time!
For statistical physicists, the above description has certainly a feeling of “de´ja`-vu”.
It is just the basic reasoning used in order to study critical, scale-free phenomena, the
fundamental concept behing the renormalisation-group theory [4] for which Kenneth Wil-
son was awarded with the 1982 Nobel prize. These phenomena are normally described by
power-law decays of the various correlations as functions of both length and time. In-
deed, there is a lot of evidence in favour of this scenario also governing biological evolution
(see, for instance, [5] and original references therein). However, the above iterative-scaling
reasoning (individual – species – genus – family – order – class) has only an illustrative
purpose.
An argument showing that evolution necessarily follows a critical dynamics was
presented in [6]. In short, it is as follows (six paragraphs). One always needs to separate
some part of the universe (a species, a geographic region, etc), in order to study its evo-
lutionary behaviour. This artificially separated part cannot be considered a closed object,
because it is always under some influence of the rest of the universe, its environment. Thus,
the system under study must necessarily be considered as an open dynamic system.
Some ingredients (mass, energy, information, etc) feed continuously the system, and in
some way are processed therein. Also, as a by-product of this procedure, the same kind
of ingredients are continuously thrown out. That is why the dynamic evolution of such a
system is always dissipative, irreversible: the would-be final situation, i.e. the attractor, is
a low-dimensional object, a null measure set compared to the whole initially available set
of possibilities. Among the many directions of the high-dimensional space of all possible
living forms, only a few remain available after the system is trapped forever inside its tiny
attractor. After that, all other directions are extinct. This is not a profitable feature, in
what concerns evolution by natural selection, which demands the eternal possibility of
visiting new forms.
The difference between the so-called regular or chaotic behaviours is the following.
Starting from two slightly distinct initial conditions, the distance ∆ from each other will
evolve as
∆(t) ∼ eλt
as the time t goes by. The so-called Lyapunov exponent λ may be negative, which corre-
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sponds to the regular case: both trajectories eventually converge to a single one, a simple
attractor. Otherwise, for positive values of λ, the system is chaotic: both trajectories di-
verge from each other inside a complicated object (anyway a low-dimensional one), usually
called a strange attractor. In both cases, regular or chaotic, after a finite transient time
τ ∼ |1/λ| the system becomes trapped, loosing forever its ability to explore the whole set
of possibilities. Again, evolution is not compatible with this scenario.
The question now is: how to preserve diversity of options, i.e. the ability to reach
any part of the high-dimensional space of possibilities, while the dynamic process itself
traps the system more and more close to a low-dimensional destiny? It is not a simple
matter of loosing some fraction of the whole space. It is worse than that: one looses entire
directions! Nature is smart enough to avoid this catastrophe by postponing it forever:
Nature “chooses” λ = 0, the complex, critical case. The above equation misses sub-
dominant terms (not-shown), which in this case become the dominant ones imposing a
much slower decaying rate. Normally they are power-laws, sometimes slower-yet-decaying
relations, anyway lacking any typical time (and length) scale. The difference is not a
mere quantitative one, it is rather qualitative: the difference between any finite time
interval, no matter how long it could be, and eternity. In order to better understand
this concept, consider an analogy with a radioactive decay described just by the above
equation: τ ∼ |1/λ| is the so-called waiting time, the time one needs to wait for the
decay of some particular nucleus, in average. After some finite time interval (say 2τ , 4τ)
the whole sample looses its radioactivity. In other cases for which this characteristic scale
is lost, i.e. λ = 0, the system’s activity never ceases. This is just what evolution needs.
Here, the precise mathematical meaning of the word never is the following. For an
exponential decay, the waiting time does not depend on the system’s size: one can make
the system larger and larger, and the waiting time will stay at the same finite value.
For the scale-free case λ = 0, however, the waiting time grows indefinitely for larger and
larger systems. In other words, the lifetime of a critical system is limited only by its size.
The lack of any typical size scale implies the corresponding lack of any typical time scale,
and vice-versa. For purists, another reasoning leading to the same conclusion follows. In
order to keep finite the minority number of individuals carrying some rare trait, avoiding
its extinction, one needs to keep alive a large enough whole population. Tolerating some
fixed, large-but-finite extinction time T , one needs to keep a population which increases
exponentially with the extinction rate |λ|. For the scale-free case λ = 0, however, it
increases according to some other slower-than-exponential rate, say a power-law, which
requires a not-so-large population. In this case, extintion can always be postponed beyond
T only by keeping some moderate population, i.e. effectively forever. A nice example
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of how Nature adopts this strategy is the extremely slow rate of extinction observed for
recessive diseases [7,6], where diploidism plays a major role.
Nature does not choose anything. In reality, natural selection itself tunes to the
critical, complex case λ = 0: only those situations avoid their own extinction, among all
other possibilities which die out along the process. That is why so many examples of fossil
data seem to agree with this scenario: the other possibilities, if any, did not survive long
enough. Also, the Lyapunov exponent λ is not just one, their number coincides with the
system’s dimensionality. Natural selection tunes as many of them as possible to the critical
value λ = 0.
Another interesting interpretation of the same concept, namely the preservation of
diversity, is as follows. In separating the system under study from its environment, only an
artificial working procedure, one needs to realise that the environment itself is not constant,
that it also evolves (normally under a slower rate). The attractor of the dynamical process
can be viewed as the current best option. However, future environment modifications will
slightly displace this optimum to neighbouring positions. Thus, evolution needs to keep
the current attractor’s neighbourhood always populated, in order to fit these unpredictable
future displacements. In other words, some degree of diversity near but outside the
current attractor must be kept forever. This feature is automatically provided by critical
dynamics, according to which the system continuously approaches its attractor but never
reaches it. Evolution is not an eugenic optimisation process where only the current “best”
is selected to survive: this would forbid natural selection itself to proceed, due to the
consequent lack of future options. Any non-critical dynamics, where the “best” form is
reached after some finite transient time, rules out evolution. Indeed, according to [8],
eugenics leads to extinction.
Probably, the reader is not confortable with the expression “space of all possible living
forms”, in which all previous reasoning is based. How to define such an object? The first
to address this question was Gregor Mendel [9], the founder of genetics, in his famous two
lectures of 1865. By breeding sexually reproducing plants, he discovered that particular
individual traits are inherited as a whole, all or nothing, yes or not, 1 or 0. Each individual
inherits half of its traits from the father, half from the mother. Mendel provided the basic
“software” theory for genetics. His work was completely forgotten for decades. Much
later, chromosomes and diploidism were discovered, confirming his original findings and
providing the “hardware” for parent’s inheritance mechanism. Mendel’s “traits” were then
physically associated with genes, small pieces of the chromossomes. Since then, it becomes
clear that characteristics acquired during the lifetime of an individual are not genetically
passed on to its offspring. Before that, missing this molecular-based genetic mechanism,
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both Lamarck and Darwin did not ruled out the possibility of passing acquired traits to
the offspring (which indeed occurs, but not genetically, except for rare cases of damaged
germ cells).
Thanks to Mendel’s idea, one can easily conceive an array of bits 1 or 0, each one
meaning whether some particular gene is present or not in a particular individual belonging
to the population under study. Thus, each conceivable individual is represented by such
an array, its total number of bits being the dimension of the quoted “space of all living
forms”. Indeed, sexually reproducing individuals must be represented by two bit-arrays
each, one inherited from the father, other from the mother. Also, the same gene can appear
in a few different forms, alleles: in order to deal with this further complication, one can
simply allocate more than one bit per gene. Anyway, our “space of all living forms” is now
well defined: its elements are bit-strings, each one corresponding to a possible existing
individual (its “genome”). The population dynamics corresponds to the evolution of a
variable number of these individuals which are alive at each time step t. The dynamic
evolution follows some rules concerning birth, death, interaction with the environment,
etc. All biological issues are included in such rules. The first mathematical description of
evolution based on this bit-string representation was the famous Eigen model [10].
At this point, after a long and dangerous digression over other fields of knowledge,
concerning which I hope the reader did not notice my complete ignorance, I am back
to the main subject of the title. Being a computer physicist without access to powerful
computers, I learned many tricks useful to save computer time and memory. One par-
ticularly important strategy is to operate directly on the bits of each computer word (a
sequence with 32 bits), through bitwise, parallel operations [11]. These tricks allow one
to perform incredible, otherwise impossible jobs. Computer modelling consists simply in
programming such rules on the computer, let them work as time goes by, and observe
the outcome. As biological issues are an enormous source of complications, one needs to
simplify these rules. In reality, one plays with toy models, opening the way for criticisms
related to reductionism. On the other hand, they are very convenient in order to analyse
which ingredients are really important and which are not, concerning particular popula-
tion features. Within a complex subject as biology, this approach could contribute with
some light for questions particularly difficult to answer by other means, moreover due to
the advantages of following the evolution in real time and the possibility of repeating the
whole history under controlled contingencies.
An example is a conjecture raised by Stephen J. Gould [12]: would some contingency
have occurred a long time ago, even a small one, slightly different than the historical
truth, then we could observe nowadays a different scenario concerning the current existing
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species. The true evolutionary tree historically followed since the onset of life on Earth
is not the only possible one, many others could also have occurred. Obviously, this issue
cannot be verified by observation, however, it can easily be simulated on computers in
the way described above. There is a set of arguments against evolution based on proba-
bilistic estimatives of the time needed to reach the enormous biological complexity we can
observe nowadays, resulting in values many orders of magnitude larger than the Universe
age! However, one needs at least to divide these estimatives by the number of possible
alternative scenarios, not just by the single one we observe today. How many they are?
This is a problem very difficult or impossible to be solved by other means than computer
simulations. Another way to understand this puzzle is to consider only a small step of the
evolutionary time, a snapshot of the evolutionary tree and all its subsequent potentially
possible scenarios a little bit later: among them, many can be discarded immediately,
presenting no growing branches at all. Thus, only the remainders which present some
possibility of further growing need to be taken into account, not the whole potential set.
This dissipative feature goes on at each new time step, cumulatively. It challenges the
estimatives of the age of life on Earth obtained by a direct comparison between the cur-
rently observed scenario and some plausible starting condition, disregarding all dissipated
possibilities in between.
In order to construct an evolutionary computer model, the first ingredient to be taken
into account is the reproductive behaviour, for instance: the bit-string of the parent is
copied into its offspring, with some possible random mutations (to flip a small number
of bits). For a sexual population, with two parallel bit-strings per individual, first one
cuts both bit-strings of the mother at the same random position, and then form one bit-
string by joining two complementary pieces to be inherited by the offspring. The other is
obtained by performing the same on the father’s genome. The second ingredient concerns
death, for instance: the death roulette randomly kills individuals at every new time step, in
order to keep constant the population. Further ingredients can be included. For instance,
the mutation rate can vary for different genes (different positions along the bit-string).
One can also give some preference for the position where the crossing is performed. Also,
diverse correlations between different genes can be included. Birth and death rates can be
genome-dependent. Geographic concerns and migrations can also be adopted. I am a very
lucky guy, because I know how to efficiently implement such rules on the computer, and
also because one has a virtually infinite number of new biological ingredients to be tested.
Nowadays, for every physics problem there are a thousand physicists working behind, while
for every thousand problems in biology there is one biologist [13]. I invite everybody to
contribute.
7
I will finish with a single example of an evolutionary computer model, which was
invented in our Institute [14]. For a review, see [15] and [16]. A further fundamental
ingredient is ageing. One can keep the age of each alive individual, updating it every
new time step, i.e. every new “year”. Instead of the whole genome, one can store only a
reduced chronological projection of it, say a 128-bit string: each bit corresponds to one
year, during the individual’s lifetime. We will call this bit-string “genome”, anyway, since
it is not modified during life. A bit 0 at position a means that no disease will appear at
this age. Otherwise, a harmful genetic disease corresponds to a bit 1: for instance, an
individual starting to be affected by Alzheimer disease since 60 years old has a bit 1 at
position a = 60. Note that Alzheimer disease starts to be harmful only after 60, but it
was already present in the individual’s genome since birth. A child suffering from Down’s
syndrome has a bit 1, say, at position a = 2. At each new year, every alive individual
whose age is above some minimum reproduction age R, say R = 15, is allowed to breed
B offspring, say B = 1, without or with sex [17]. Also each individual with more than
T genetic diseases accumulated up to its current age, say T = 3, dies. Another set of
individuals also dies at random, independently of age or genome, in order to mimic non-
genetic deaths avoiding population explosion.
This model makes concrete the evolutionary theory of ageing [18]. According to
this theory, we age due to inheritance from our ancestors: would they have too much
genetic diseases programmed in their genomes to occur at youth, then they would die
before breeding. Thus, our true ancestors had their genomes “clean” enough (without or
with only few genetic diseases) up to their reproduction age. However, they could be
our ancestors even presenting very “dirty” genomes after their reproduction age. Being
descendents of them, so we are: almost free of genetic diseases before the reproduction
age. That is why we start to suffer from more and more diseases when we become old,
i.e. after the reproduction age. A guy like Dietrich Stauffer, who has no known offspring,
is supposed to live forever, according to his own (wrong) interpretation of the theory. A
striking consequence of this theory is: a species which, besides the minimum reproduction
age, has also a maximum reproduction ageM (for menopause), evolves to a situation such
that nobody survives beyond ageM . This is just the case of the pacific salmon, for instance.
This behaviour is nicely reproduced [19] by the Penna model, simply by introducing this
new ingredient: a maximum reproduction age. Women present menopause around 50
years old, contrary to men who are in principle able to reproduce until death. Thanks to
men, women were allowed by Nature to live beyond 50. Is menopause explainable from
evolutionary arguments? According to Williams [20] the answer is yes. His theoretical
argument concerns a compromise between child care and reproduction risk for the mother:
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it would be better for the mother to stop reproduction at some age, avoiding the risk
of death during future childbirths, in order to be able to take care of the already born
offspring. Indeed, including these two ingredients, namely child care and reproduction
risk, a menopause age naturally arises from the Penna model [21]. According to data
collected by Sir Thomas Perls and colleagues [22], longevity is inheritable. Again, the
Penna model reproduces quite well these data [23].
Many similar models consider characteristics other than ageing, some of them in [24].
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